Aircraft Warning/Message System – Stab Trim Fail
The flight was originating from White Plains, NY (HPN) to Westhampton Beach, NY (FOK) at night with no passengers. I’m pilot in command (PIC) of the trip, pilot flying from the right seat while second in command (SIC) pilot monitoring from the left seat. As per the weight and balance and TOLD card, I set the trim to -2.7 degrees. We started our engines at about 2105 EST. We used the company/FAA approved Normal checklists: Before Start, Engine Start, After Start, Taxi, and Takeoff Checklist. We held short of Runway 34 then cleared for takeoff. The left seat pilot lined up on the runway, transferred control to me on the right. Both pilots performed a flight control check on the runway, before I commenced the takeoff. No CAS message was displayed, and APU was off. Takeoff was about 2115 EST.
I (right seat) rotated, with the left seat pilot calling normal callouts. After rotation, I felt more downward force was needed than normal as airspeed was increasing. I told him that I needed a lot more forward pressure, and that I don’t have control. The SIC came up on the controls with me, as we both used both of our hands to push the nose down. We received the following Amber CAS messages: AP STAB TRIM INOP and PRIMARY STAB TRIM FAIL and I declared an emergency.
The controller asked to state the emergency and asked if we wanted to head back. I said, “No, going to Stewart” (SWF). We were cleared direct SWF, then I asked for vectors. We were given heading of 360 degrees. The controller then asked what attitude we wanted. The left seat responded that we cannot control the airplane and was given any altitude.
The SIC selected secondary trim, and tried to add forward trim but it did not move. I also tried, and again it did not move.
I pulled out the aircraft’s “Pilots’ Checklist” referred to the Emergency/Abnormal Procedures and ran the appropriate checklists. AP STAB TRIM INOP checklist was completed then moved on to PRIMARY STAB TRIM FAIL. While running the checklist, I also assisted the SIC with the forward pressure on the control column. As per the checklist, it referred me to the Emergency/Abnormal procedures, Jammed Stabilizer Trim System checklist. I used the second bullet point per our emergency “Jammed at -2.0 to -5.0 degrees (Typical Low Speed Cruise/Approach Configuration)” Our trim setting was at -2.7 degrees and stayed at that trim setting the entre flight. As per the checklist, it asked for speed limitation of “140 KIAS Maximum”. We slowed the plane down and this allowed us more control at slower airspeed and less forward pressure was needed.
I asked for the landing runway at SWF and was given the weather. We flew the visual to Runway 27 backed up with the RNAV-Y. I manually set up the V REF of 106 KIAS. We were switched to tower and were cleared to land Runway 27. The Abnormal/ Emergency Checklist was completed.
The SIC still has both hands on the control while I had my right hand on the yoke and left hand on the throttles. We flew the final together and landed together.
We stopped on the runway was asked by tower if we can taxi with our own power. I replied in the affirmative, and was instructed to taxi via Runway 27 and left on H to Textron/Citation Service Center. ARFF followed us to the service center. We parked, completed the After Landing and the Shutdown/APU Off Checklist. I met with the maintenance team that was waiting for us outside of the hangar and also spoke to the Fire Chief.
KEY ERC TAKEAWAYS
Exceptional job by the crew handling the situation in night conditions and landing aircraft safely.
- Aircraft recently underwent a painting service, with horizontal stabilizer having to be sanded and repainted several times. Investigation found paint and debris in wiper fairing of horizontal stabilizer, as well as primary pitch trim actuator failure.
- Parts have been replaced and serviced.
- The jammed stabilizer scenario is now a mandatory event for pilots simulator training.
- A safety newsletter has been sent out to the pilot group.
Altitude Deviation – RUUDY 6 (TEB)
The crew was cleared to depart KTEB on the RUUDY SIX departure from Runway 24. The departure was thoroughly briefed to include departure routing, altitudes and flight modes. The crew departed Runway 24, after a positive rate of climb the pilot flying called for gear up, the non-flying pilot retracted the landing gear, at 400 ft AGL the pilot flying called “SF clean and climb”, the non-flying pilot selected SF 0 and climb mode. The pilot flying then requested the autopilot, the non-flying selected autopilot.
The autopilot annunciator was not illuminated on the PFD and the autopilot was not engaged. The pilot flying communicated this to the non-flying pilot, the non-flying pilot selected the autopilot. The departure has a 1500 foot mandatory crossing altitude at WENTZ. As the aircraft climbed to 1500 feet the non-flying pilot mentioned “altitude”, as the aircraft leveled off it exceeded the 1500 restriction at WENTZ by about 190 feet.
KEY ERC TAKEAWAYS
- Crew debriefed and counseled.
- Company procedures regarding the use of auto-throttles have been amended, instructing pilots not to use automation on departures at RUUDY SIX.
- Operator added a safety memo for TEB departures.
- Sole source event, no brasher warning filed.
KTEB ATC Letter to Airmen – Notice Number: NOTC2453
Due to a recent increase in RUUDY 6 pilot deviations, as well as a runway 19 missed approach pilot
deviations, has prompted the FAA to issue two Letters to Airmen:
• LTA 47: RUUDY6 Departure Risk
• LTA 48: Missed Approach ILS RWY 19
The LTAs can be found in NOTAMs for TEB airport:
The Teterboro Users Group created and disseminated RUUDY 6 guidance material, which can be found on NOTC 2445.
Since the RUUDY 6 is the primary SID issued to flight crews departing KTEB Runway 24, please carefully review the text and graphics specified on the Jeppesen and/or U.S. Government charts, and brief the lateral and vertical modes, ASEL selection, automation management and crew coordination requirements necessary to comply with all published lateral and vertical provisions of the procedure.
Runway Incursion
This was my first time meeting and flying with the SIC. During our preflight briefing, he told me that he had approximately 100 hours in the G550. This was my first flight on the G550. I had fully briefed the AWARE checklist items while still on the FBO ramp, but held the departure briefing as I normally complete this during taxi before switching to tower frequency.
We had an extended period on the ramp due to WX & lightening delays prior to receiving fuel. After an approximate 1 hour ground delay, we were cleared from FLL Signature Aviation to RWY 10L via E to B. I called for flaps 20 and taxi checks while enroute which SIC/PM was completing while still on B but before approaching the hold short. When he got to “takeoff briefing” on the taxi checks he responded “completed.” He did not give me a chance to respond before he called Tower for takeoff even though I had not actually completed the takeoff briefing, including the abort criteria.
The clearance I heard him respond to was “hold short” but I did not clearly hear his response which was sort of muffled with a thick accent. There was a lot of radio chatter on Tower around that time. After his initial call to Tower, the SIC asked for “one-up,” to which I responded “we will hold that until taking the runway.” I proceeded to complete my abort criteria briefing while approaching the hold short. As I was coming to a stop at the hold short, SIC/PM stated that we are cleared to line-up and wait and also said “go-go.” I did not hear this call for line-up from tower but assumed that I may have missed it as I was completing my abort criteria and safety return briefing. I asked him if he was sure and he responded again, “yes, yes, cleared to line up and wait.”
Before taking the runway (WX clear), I visually acquired a line of traffic for 10L including one on a several mile final which in my estimation would not have been a conflict had we been given a takeoff clearance as we were positioning. I then heard Tower give the traffic on final a go-around, which then made it clear to me that we were not cleared onto the runway. We were instructed to taxi clear and take down a number to call.
Later after we took off and had a chance to debrief what happened, SIC/PM iterated that he was 100 percent sure we were given line up and wait instructions. He also said that he responded “line up and wait.” He iterated this multiple times as we further discussed the incident. He still thinks we were given line up and wait instructions.
On our flight to KBED and then onwards to EGGW, it became clear to me that this SIC sometimes does not hear clearly even when talking directly with him on/off the aircraft. He missed a lot of radio calls or did not hear them clearly to the point that he repeatedly asked for clarification from the controller. I had to remind him several times that I was also listening and that he should ask me first before transmitting on the radio. At one point we were scolded by London control for misinterpreting calls. On several occasions I had to answer some calls for him. I’m not sure if it is a hearing issue, a comprehension issue, or just difficulty on this day.
Prior to this flight I had made some assumptions of his ability based on what I was told, so when he told me that we were cleared to line up and wait I made the assumption that I missed the call while briefing him. After observing him now, I know that I have to back him up more carefully than I had originally assumed. Other than this communication issue, he is a great copilot and I enjoy flying with him.
KEY ERC TAKEAWAYS
- Pilot deviation filed by ATC.
- ATC tapes reviewed with FAA Principal Operations Inspector.
- Crew debriefed and counseled by Chief Pilot and Director of Safety.
- Event discussed in length during safety stand down meeting.
- Updated SOPs published and released to the pilot group.
