GPS Spoofing (International)
We departed EFKT airport at 12:02Z on December 18th, 2024. We departed EFKT approximately 2 hours behind schedule. We were cruising along Lithuania, approaching to Poland. We encountered with ADS-B Fail Caution CAS messages when We were approaching waypoint BOKSU. We followed the checklist to solve this problem, followed appropriate checklist from the G650 AFM procedure for resolving the ADS-B issue. I attempted to resolve the issue by selecting an alternative transponder, but the ADS-B failure persisted. ATC lost our radar contact for ADS-B and Transponder Mode C/S. ATC initiated radar vectors for the aircraft, attempting to direct us back to the departure airport (EFKT). Poland Airspace: When the flight approached Polish airspace, entry was denied, and you were instructed to continue. We attempted to recycle Transponder 1 and Transponder 2 to reestablish radar contact with ATC, but the issue persisted, and ATC could not reacquire radar contact. We continued to orbit while awaiting further instructions and considering next steps. ADS-B and Transponder Failures: Our aircraft is equipped with a transponder system, checking its configuration and ensuring it’s correctly set up. We thought there was a systematic issue or fault in the avionics system, due to all transponders malfunctioning, not reporting position and altitude. ATC could not get through in Poland airspace and orbiting. We reviewed fuel consumption and tried lowering altitude to get aircraft transponder 1 and 2 back. We ensured that the aircraft is still within safe operating limits, particularly with regard to fuel reserves, and keep track of how long we can remain in the air to solve this problem. While we were orbiting the area, ATC told us Riga Control (Latvia) denied us to enter their airspace. It was our only option for us to divert to EYVI. We reviewed available options and considered fuel reserves. The crew decided to divert to Vilnius Airport (EYVI) for a safe landing.
ERC Acceptance & Closing notes:
- Crew debriefed. Followed proper procedures.
- Maintenance inspection did not find any abnormalities with navigation systems.
- Presumably GPS spoofing event.
KEY ERC TAKEAWAYS
- Geopolitical conflicts worldwide continue to pose challenges and potential dangers for the aviation industry.
- Increased GPS spoofing events are occurring, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
- Crews must be aware of these challenges and proactively train for such scenarios.
- In this instance, pilots effectively mitigated the situation by diverting and landing safely..
Fuel Dump Without Notice
Overview: During cruise at FL360, the crew experienced a Cautionary (AMBER) Message from the EICAS labeled “EMER BATT OVERHT”. In response, the crew took immediate action in accordance with the Gulfstream G200 QRH procedures. The crew followed the checklist and contained the Emergency Battery temperature, and it remained stable at approximately 140 degrees Fahrenheit. The crew then decided that the best option, in the interest of safety and considering all factors, was to return to the departure airport/and aircraft operation base – KPBI. Then the crew requested with ATC an air turnback, and routing to KPBI. Jacksonville Center asked if the crew needed to declare an emergency, based on the stability of the present situation the crew advised “Not at this time, we will advise if we need to declare an emergency”.
The crew was cleared to PBI via direct to MOLIE to join the VUUDU ONE Arrival, and to descend to FL350. Once the Crew finished programming and considering the new route, they realized that given the current condition of the aircraft an overweight landing at PBI was imminent. In that moment, the initial solution was to request a lower altitude in an effort to burn more fuel to comply with the Maximum Landing Weight of the aircraft. The crew requested a descent and was cleared to descend to FL250 early. Upon Reaching FL250 the crew realized that flying at a lower altitude would not be sufficient to consume enough fuel to arrive below the maximum landing weight. At this time the crew made the decision to follow the G200 Fuel Jettison QRH Procedure.
Considering the high altitude (FL250) and the terrain below (unpopulated), the crew commenced the Fuel Jettison Procedure while flying. This took place on the arrival just past the fix FANTE until the aircraft was passing LUCYS fix, this was approximately 7 minutes while descending from FL250 through approximately 14,000ft. The crew observed that the calculation of landing weight would be 30,000 pounds, the published maximum landing weight, and promptly stopped the fuel jettison.
The descent, approach, and landing were completely normal aside from the battery condition.
Reason for Not Declaring an Emergency:
According to the QRH and the situation at hand, the crew considered that at that time it was not necessary to declare an emergency. The issue with the battery temperature was contained by QRH action, and the crew thoroughly discussed that if the battery continued to overheat there would be no hesitation to declare an emergency.
The EICAS system alerts the crew of an OVERHEAT at 140 degrees as an AMBER CAUTION message, and at 160 degrees it becomes a RED WARNING MESSAGE. The battery temperature was monitored the entire flight.
Reason for Not Informing ATC: In the interest of safety, the crew needed to deal with the situation efficiently while using the tools that they had to protect the aircraft from an overweight landing. The crew was unaware of the obligation to make this request with ATC.
Environmental Considerations: The crew determined that the combination of high altitude (FL250-14,000ft) as well as their position over unpopulated areas would have minimal impact on the nearby environment.
Corrective Actions Taken:
- Debriefed with crew post-flight to identify gaps in procedure and communication.
- Steps for Future Prevention:
- Implementing a personal checklist to ensure ATC is notified during non-standard operations.
- Reviewing CRM and emergency decision-making with my flight department.
- Participating in additional training to enhance situational awareness during high-stress scenarios.
Voluntary Disclosure (ASRS Submission): This report is being submitted to the FAA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System to highlight the incident and contribute to overall aviation safety improvements. The intent is to identify systemic issues and prevent recurrence.seat when the other pilot is greatly fatigued. Also, this would build my experience as well, which benefits the company down the road.
ERC Notes:
- Task saturation identified as a contributing factor.
- Crew needed to land as soon as possible due to battery overheating issue.
- Fuel released at a high altitude over ocean.
- Event investigated internally.
- Crew debriefed and counseled on proper communications with ATC during QRH and non-standard operations.
- Event to be discussed during monthly safety meeting.
- No inquiries from EPA or regulatory agencies.
KEY ERC TAKEAWAYS
- The crew is commended for their quick decision-making and safe landing.
- It is crucial to follow proper communication procedures with ATC.
- Adhering to communication protocols helps avoid potential regulatory violations.
Closed Runway Landing
Captain
On this date, I was PIC and pilot flying an empty repo leg from PVD to CQX. I reported our out time as 1005 local. The last CQX METAR I reviewed indicated the ceiling was 3100. There was a layer reported as “few” below that at 1800 feet, so chose to depart PVD under IFR.
When the approach controller for the CQX area was told that we had the 1-minute weather and that we wanted the RNAV-B approach, we were cleared to a fix on the feeder route. Several minutes later, when we were approximately 20 miles from the fix, we were given a crossing restriction and cleared for the approach. As we made the turn to join the final approach course, the controller terminated radar services and provided IFR cancellation instructions. My SIC changed frequency to CTAF and made at least two (2) transmissions that I recall on the CTAF that we were inbound on the RNAV-B landing runway 24. There was no traffic in the vicinity, and no airport personnel replied to our transmissions on the CTAF, which I had confirmed was the proper frequency during our approach briefing. Further, the CTAF is the FBO’s frequency. I estimate that we landed at 1042 local in that I reported we were “in” at 1045 local. My SIC canceled our IFR flight plan through the RCO once we had cleared the runway.
After landing, when I asked the line staff inside the FBO for fuel, the person staffing the desk was surprised we were there because “the runway was closed due to field conditions.” It turns out that a NOTAM was published closing the runway at 1037 local, approximately 5 minutes prior to the time we landed. I believe this was after the approach controller had terminated radar services because, as stated above, we were terminated just after we had intercepted the final approach course, an approximately 12 NM leg. We were unaware that there had been any NOTAM published closing the runway.
Once visual, I observed a wet runway with a snow-covered patch beyond the touchdown zone. The landing was uneventful despite a light crosswind and my use of full reverse, and I did not experience any difficulty maintaining directional control. I did not use brakes until approximately the last 500 feet, and I did not encounter any adverse response to braking.
I discussed the situation of landing on a closed runway with operational control and agreed to monitor runway conditions for it to be reopened and to advise operational control prior to departing. At the request of operational control, I searched, but could not locate the airport manager to discuss the situation. At approximately 1119 local, I noticed the NOTAM closing the runway was gone and had been replaced by a FICON NOTAM with a timestamp 1107 local. That NOTAM indicated 5/5/5. See attached briefing.
The FICON NOTAM further reported 1/8-inch dry snow over both 80% and 40% of the runway. Regardless of this probable typo, I discussed the fact that the runway was no longer closed with operational control who approved our departure. We departed without incident after I reported us out at 1139 local.
First Officer
On 01/12/2025 I was SIC and Pilot monitoring. We departed KPVD around 10:00 am going to KCQX on an IFR flight plan. The ceiling in KCQX was around 3,100 ft broken. We flew the RNAV-B to runway 24. The runway had areas covered with snow from the runway number and over the threshold, but ahead of it there were clear spots and wet spots. The approach configuration was flaps 15 in pusher ice mode due to icing. We had a good visual of the runway and by common agreement we determined it was safe to land. After taxing and parking the airplane on the ramp, we came to the FBO and learned that the runway 6/24 was closed by a NOTAM at 1537z (10:37 local time). We landed around 10:42 am. The Captain immediately reached out to Operational Control and advised them about the situation. On our way to KCQX, I got the weather on the ASOS frequency, and no NOTAMs were reported. Once we were told by Boston to change to CTAF, I made about 4 calls reporting our position and intensions. In the beginning of our duty day, there were no NOTAMs that would affect our flights. This seemed to be a sudden runway closure due to the runway conditions WHILE WE WERE FLYING to KCQX. Shortly after, the NOTAM was changed to a braking action report of 5/5/5 80pct 1/8-inch dry SNOW. After the Captain talked to the company and the runway closure NOTAM was removed, we continued our day as scheduled.
Immediate Action(s) Taken
I was able to see the runway once we had descended below the cloud layer. I could tell there was a wet area that was my aim point and intended point of touchdown, which was in the touchdown zone. Beyond that, the runway was snow covered for a distance that I estimated to be only a couple hundred feet long where I presume the wind had blown snow across the runway. The rest of the runway appeared only wet beyond the snow to the far end of the runway. I stated my intention to land in the wet area, which I did. The wet area in the touchdown zone was approximately one half (1/2) the size of the snow-covered portion.
I made my approach at flaps 15 degrees due to being in pusher ice mode, and I maintained the computed speed displayed by the dynamic speed bug for the last 500 to 1000 feet of the approach to landing. On short final, I stated to my SIC that the runway appeared otherwise clear, and he concurred, so I proceeded to land. A post flight walk around revealed no damage or abnormalities. Then, as described above, once I was informed by FBO staff that the runway was closed, I called operational control to discuss the situation.
Suggestions for correction
I believe this was a result of poor timing in that the NOTAM closing the runway was published during the very brief time we were off frequency with the approach controller but prior to landing. I do not believe any crew action could have prevented this incident.
KEY ERC TAKEAWAYS
- Event investigated internally. Operator confirmed the time sequence mentioned in the report.
- Crew did not receive any notice of the runway closure.
- Uncontrolled airfield. Runway closed while aircraft was on the final approach. Crew was announcing positions (including UNICOM frequency), did not receive any responses/warnings.
- Root cause: unfortunate timing of runway closure minutes before aircraft landed.
- Runway was re-opened minutes later after landing.
