Airspace Deviation
Descending into [airport] we were talking with Fort Worth Center waiting to be cleared for a visual approach. The airport ATIS was advertising to expect a visual approach for runway 17; we were planning to request visual runway 13 due to the runway length being longer and the avionics being already set up for it.
The center controller was quite busy. They cleared us down to 4000 feet, told us the location of the airport, and were waiting for us to call it in sight—to this point, they had still not advised us which runway to expect. With how busy they were, we were unable to inform them we had the airport in sight until we were 1-2 miles from the edge of the airport’s Class D airspace.
When we informed them, we stated the airport was in sight and requested visual 13 in the same radio call; they responded with a clearance for visual 17. We then called back, accepted the visual to 17, and asked if we could get the visual 13. A different controller voice came on the radio and stated that it was too late and told us to contact tower—this all occurred as we were crossing the lateral confines of the Class D at 4,000 feet.
Since we were cleared for the visual 17, we began descending from 4,000 feet and aligned ourselves for a visual to 17 as we switched over to tower. We called up tower, informed them we were on the visual 17 and asked for the visual to 13. He responded asking where we were at, and I informed him that we were 1 mile south of the airport. At this point we were at approximately 2,500 feet—below the 3,300 foot top of Class D. The tower controller then quipped back that we were required to contact him before entering Class D airspace. I stated that the center controller sent us over very late, to which he stated that it didn’t change the regulation. He then cleared us to land and we landed without further incident.
Suggestions: I believe there were two primary factors at play resulting in this event. The first was how busy Fort Worth center was which resulted in nonstandard actions from them. They had not informed us what runway to plan on or asked us which one we wanted, and we were not able to contact them due to radio congestion—this resulted in very late communication and the inability to coordinate runways.
The second factor was a lack of understanding how center and tower controllers interact with each other when a visual approach clearance is assigned. We operated as if they had coordinated with each other on a visual approach clearance and that the clearance authorized us to descend and maneuver as necessary—including entry into the Class D.
Safety Takeaway:
The event occurred during the U.S. government shutdown, a challenging time for national airspace. High ATC workload, congested frequencies, late runway assignment, and assumptions about center-tower coordination led to confusion regarding Class D airspace entry.
Landing Gear Malfunction
On the visual approach to RWY in [airport] after putting the gear down on approach to landing, the right landing gear light on the gear light enunciator did not illuminate. After a brief discussion, the crew contacted tower and made them aware of the issue.
The crew decided to continue the approach and fly over the field to have tower visually inspect the gear position. The crew briefed a normal missed approach with the exception of the gear remaining in the down position. Tower indicated the gear appeared to be in the down position.
The crew was instructed to fly the published missed approach up to 4000 ft, but was subsequently given a heading of 210. After completing the missed approach with associated checklist, the crew requested vectors to the north of the airport to troubleshoot the issue. Departure gave instruction to climb to 7000 ft.
At this point, the PM made the passenger aware of the situation and briefed them on the intention of the crew to troubleshoot. Troubleshooting to determine Gear Down included pushing the Gear Indicator Light Housing and determining bulb operation. Reducing power below 85% N1 without a gear horn aural warning. lowering flaps beyond approach position with NO aural warning. No red handle in transit light. The light remained extinguished after the handle was placed in the down position. While on a heading given by ATC, the crew advised departure of the inability to climb to 7000 ft due to drag from the gear. The PM attempted to eliminate the possibility of a light bulb issue by replacing the right main gear light bulb per a conversation with maintenance. After replacing both the left and the right gear indication lights, both did not illuminate. There was a discussion between the PM and maintenance and it was decided as a crew to complete the Manual Landing Gear Extension checklist.
The crew followed the checklist which instructed first to pull the landing gear circuit breaker relay. The crew then completed the checklist items which instructed hand pumping the gear down with the emergency gear extension handle. The PF, with positive exchange of controls to the PM, hand pumped the gear extension handle for approximately two minutes with no change in indication or hydraulic tension in the handle. The crew made the decision for the PM to land the plane from the right seat while the PF pumped the manual extension handle before landing, per the associated checklist.
The crew declared an emergency with departure and noted fuel and SOB before receiving vectors for the visual approach to RWY. The PF made a normal approach to landing and stopped on the runway. The crew then completed the engine securing checklist and shut down the aircraft on the runway. The passenger was directed to exit the aircraft with the maintenance team. The aircraft was towed from the runway by the maintenance team.
ERC Investigation Notes:
- Crew acted appropriately, in accordance with QRH and company protocols/manuals.
- Event reviewed, findings shared with pilot group.
- Landing gear malfunction scenario has been added to FSI training.
Safety Takeaway:
Commendable crew resource management by the pilots, effectively coordinating with ATC, maintenance team, and operations. Clear communications and compliance with published procedures allowed the crew to manage uncertainty and land safely.
Course Deviation – ATC Error
Departing [airport], we were given clearance for runway 7R. After receiving the clearance we were made aware of a plane behind us on final being told to go around, along with a departure on 7L, a parallel runway. I (the PIC) flew the takeoff and upon becoming airborne, the tower controller issued us a new clearance to fly runway heading.
While doing this we were given a TCAS warning (not with a RA) from the above airplane who did not offset or make the necessary turn on the go around. When we were given the next clearance, we were told to “turn on course” and told to contact the approach frequency. Upon contacting approach, the controller appeared confused and said we were supposed to be on runway heading (we were turning left to catch the departure procedure as cleared).
I told the controller that we were given a clearance on course and were in the left turn to fly the assigned procedure, but that we were ready to accept new instructions (as it was becoming clear that the previous controller may have given us conflicting instructions, leaving us in a place that may need assistance from ATC. We were then given (and complied with) instructions to commence a safe climb out.
Before leaving Phoenix Approach’s airspace, we were given a number to contact when we were on the ground. e the flight was completed, I called the number and talked to an individual from the ATC facility. He had mentioned that they had listened back through the tapes and concluded that we had done nothing wrong and would need no further information from me. He mentioned that they would need to do an internal investigation to determine the source of the confusion regarding the tower controller’s clearances, mentioning that we should have never been issued the clearance for the departure procedure in the first place (there was a plane departing the parallel runway just before our departure and the clearance would have taken us across their departure path.
Our conversation ended with him concluding that we did not commit any violations and that they would not need any further information. Should there be any questions regarding the encounter in the future, I wanted to document it here.We had crossed runway 10/28 at KSVH and made a radio call on the CTAF that we would be taxing to hold short of runway 10 for departure. While taxing we took note of the multiple planes in the traffic pattern for runway 10 verifying visually what our TCAS and ADSB traffic with foreflight was showing around us. Upon holding short of runway 10 we waited for a C-172 to land, and my captain and I agreed we had ample time to line up and wait on the runway after they would land to allow them to do their touch-and-go / taxi off the runway.
ERC Investigation Notes:
- Operator reached out to TRACON manager to discuss the event.
- Event was briefed by the pilot group at monthly safety meeting.
Safety Takeaway:
The event illustrates how conflicting ATC instructions can create procedural conflicts even when crews are compliant with issued clearances. Pilot’s situational awareness and clear communications with ATC mitigated a potential airborne conflict.
Weather Diversion
We checked the TAF for the destination before departure and several times in flight. Weather was forecast to be VFR at time of arrival. Checking the METAR on descent, visibility of 600 meters was reported in a SPECI. Minimum visibility for the ILS is 800 meters.
It was early in the morning and we continued with the expectation it would likely burn off. The METAR was not updated and after 30 minutes or more we requested a check on the weather from Lisbon control. They checked an told us visibility was 5 kilometers.
The updated METAR showed 200 meters visibility and we asked Lisbon to check again and they confirmed it was 5 kilometers. We continued and on contacting Beja approach we were told the visibility was 200 meters in ground fog. We asked for a hold to look at options, since we had a good amount of fuel. Approach would not give us any estimate of when they thought the fog might burn off.
We informed ops of intent to divert to the filed alternate, [ALT 1] however they informed us parking there would be a problem and we should go to [ALT 2] instead and we requested this from ATC. As we proceeded to [ALT 2], we got a message from ops that the handler at Beja that the weather had improved there. I really did not want to divert so we asked ATC to check again and they confirmed it was still 200 meters visibility there.
We continued to [ALT 2] and landed there and the passengers left for their destination. I would like to have held and waited for the fog to burn off, but this might have been 30 minutes or it might have been two hours. We were at our maximum flight time by then so it was better to divert.
ERC Investigation Notes:
- Crew acted appropriately
- Report submitted for data collection
- Sole source event
Safety Takeaway:
Excellent decision making by the crew while dealing with conflicting meteorological information, highlighting effective risk management by prioritizing verified data over optimistic forecasts and external pressure.
