Runway Overrun
Incident Date: June 7, 2025
Aircraft: [tail number]
KCGF
Weather forecast at arrival Wind 320° at 6 knots, 29.93
Landing runway 6
I [name] was the PIC on a flight from KHXD to KCGF. Flight was performed under part 135. Prepared for the flight and everything was normal for that day’s flight operations. Checked weather and did flight planning as per company procedures including the weight and balance. All aspects of the flight were within the limitations of the aircraft. Had planned to land at KCGF with 10,000LBS of fuel at 56,792Lbs on arrival. Performance was determined to be well within limits. The flight to our destination was normal without any issues.
Once we were in range, we picked up the ATIS and the field landing on runway 6. We did the landing performance on the FMS, briefed the GPS 6 approach before commencing our descent! Everything stood right and there were no abnormalities during the initial descent into the field. The final approach segment started without any issues. We were fully configured by the final approach fix per the stabilized approach criteria. Coming over the runway, touchdown roughly about 500ft past the touchdown zone. The touchdown on the runway was very smooth, and spoilers did not deploy. I deployed the TRs to full reverse and brake on the aircraft. With our approach speed being higher, I primarily focused on using the breaks and maximum TRs to get the aircraft stopped. The crew did not deploy the speed breaks manually during the landing roll. As we approached the end of the runway we were decelerating but not enough to stay on the runway.
We overran the runway into the EMAS by about 12 to 15 feet. The EMAS overran was at a fairly low speed and the aircraft was decelerating at that point. After coming to a full stop the tower was notified. We shut the aircraft down at this point and did a wellness check to make sure that all the crew and passengers were not injured. Pax deplaned and were taken to the FBO after they got off the plane. I made a phone call to the company after making sure that all passengers and crew were safe and off the aircraft. An assessment was performed on the aircraft and did not observe any major damage to the aircraft after the incident. The crew worked hand in hand with airport operations, [company name] team to get the aircraft moved off the runway.
ERC Acceptance & Closing Notes:
- Non sole source.
- PIC went to recurrent after incident – modified training to include extra landing training – SIM training as well.
- Company briefed this in pilot meeting.
Safety Takeaway:
Pilots should be reminded to always monitor the aircraft’s response during approach and landing. Engineered Materials Arrestor System (EMAS) played a critical role for this event.
We must emphasize that the safety system serves as a crucial safety net, preventing injuries and damage to aircraft during runway overruns.
Aircraft System/Equipment Malfunction – Cabin Pressurization
Bottom line up front: After takeoff, my SIC failed to properly conduct the “before takeoff below the line” and the After Takeoff checklists resulting in a cabin altitude high warning that led to an emergency descent and return to KGRK.
In order to obtain max performance takeoff, I called for the bleed air to remain ENVIRO OFF and briefed. Once cleared for takeoff, I did my flow and called for the before takeoff checklist below the line. Prior to applying power, my SIC stated “below the line complete”. After takeoff, at 400′, I called for direct SJT, NAV, YD, climb power, and FLC. At approximately 2000’MSL I asked if the After Takeoff checklist was completed and my SIC stated “after takeoff checklist complete”. At 10,000’MSL I called for the checklist and that checklist was completed. At approximately 14,500’MSL aircraft altitude the Cabin Altitude Master Warning illuminated, and the passenger oxygen masks deployed. I immediately disconnected the autopilot, pushed props too high, began a descent to 10,000’MSL, and advised ATC. During the descent, while attempting to diagnose the cause, I noticed that the bleed air valves were still in the ENVIRO OFF position. After selecting the bleed air valves to “on” the aircraft began to pressurize properly.
A possible contributing factor for causing SIC distraction was a thunderstorm 8 miles south of the airfield. We were taking off from runway 15 with a right turn to 270 after takeoff. I believe the primary contributing factor is that my SIC does not know his flows, improperly runs checklists, and just seems lost inside the airplane.
I take responsibility as the Captain/PIC for not catching that the After Takeoff checks were not completed properly and am now ensuring my SIC flows/checklists are properly conducted. I feel that the pilot running the silent checklist verifying proper switch positions while completing the checklist and knowing appropriate flows will prevent recurrence of this situation. As the PIC, I will ensure to visually verify proper switch positions after silent checklist are conducted to prevent this from happening again.
I do not feel that my SIC is a safe pilot that can be paired with just any PIC. He should only be paired with a seasoned PIC with the company or one with a lot of prior King Air experience and informed about his expected performance. I did not feel unsafe because I have flown the King Air for over 2,000 hours and flew with new pilots often as a Unit Trainer while in the military.
ERC Acceptance & Closing Notes:
- PIC was counseled on overall responsibility of PIC to ensure that ALL checklist items are completed. Also, counseled on continuing the climb beyond the O2 requirements.
- SIC was counseled and verbally retrained by ACP – Decided that SIC would be placed with IOE captains at different bases to give him different learning opportunities.
Safety Takeaway:
Whether the PIC is Pilot Flying/Monitoring or SIC is Pilot Flying/Monitoring, crewmembers must ensure they are proficient with their aircraft and regulations. Captains are responsible for the overall operation and safety of the aircraft. This includes monitoring their First Officer’s actions in-flight.
Approach/Arrival Event – Wrong Airport
The flight was on the last leg of a Medivac trip that departed VNY @ 1855 local. The Medivac was for a medical team from SFO to RNO then back to SFO. We departed SFO @ 2333 Local. We knew that VNY was closed, that is why we were returning to BUR. Checking in with Socal App close to FIM VOR, we were told to proceed to SILEX for Runway 8.
At approx. 0021 local we were informed that Runway 8 had just been closed and asked if we could do a Visual Approach to Runway 15. We said yes and were assigned a Visual Approach to RW 15.
At 0022 we checked in with BUR Tower and given clearance to land. At approx. 0023 I asked my copilot to load Visual App to RW 15 in the Garmin 750. The FMS generated a course of 120 degrees to the waypoint. I turned and in front of me I saw REILS, I proceeded to land.
After landing I realized I had landed at WHP. I would like to point out that BUR RW 15 only has REIL. After Clearing the Runway at WHP we worked up the takeoff data. With the help of Police 100 Helicopter we were able to tell BUR Tower we were OK and preparing to take off and proceed to BUR. WE announced on 135.00, WHP CTAF, that we were taking off, and once airborne contacted BUR Tower on 118.70 for landing.
ERC Acceptance & Closing Notes:
- Sole source event.
- Crew debriefed and counseled. Reviewed SOPs.
- Challenging visibility during night operations. Event discussed with the entire pilot group during safety meeting.
- Both BUR RW15 and WHP RWY have REIL lights, contributing to confusion.
- Operator reached out to SoCal ATC manager regarding delayed communications.
Safety Takeaway:
Night operations can cause more confusion due to limited visibility. It is important to always confirm airport and runway information as a crew, especially for night operations. Crew members should be trained to not have expectation bias in this similar type of event.
