The following are redacted Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reports from participating member companies during the first quarter of 2024. Each case underscores the unique challenges that test the skills and preparedness of the crew. These incidents highlight the critical importance of adhering to standard procedures and the valuable lessons learned from navigating unexpected situations.
ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED EXCURSION
We departed KORL on RWY 7 on the NYTES1 SID. The altitude restriction is listed at or below 1500 at NYTES (which is 7 miles away). Since KORL is in Class C airspace and underlying the KMCO Class B, the airspeed is limited to 200 KIAS. During the initial climb, which is normally a busy time with gear, flaps and radio changes, the PIC (PF) engaged the autopilot at approximately 1100′.
Our climb rate was too great to allow the AP to effectively capture the 1500 crossing limitation and we quickly flew through 1500. At 1600+’, I saw the excursion and called “ALTITUDE, we’re supposed to be at 1500”. The PF disengaged the AP and hand flew back to 1500′ (the highest altitude I saw was 1720). During this excursion, MCO approach called for us to “immediately descend to 1500” and then continued to stress the importance of maintaining the crossing restriction due to overflying aircraft into MCO at 2500′. I told him that the AP didn’t capture the altitude. He basically said we needed to figure out how to meet that restriction regardless of the reason. We could also hear the ATC alarms sounding in his background. During the PF’s recovery to 1500, I saw that the airspeed had increased to 242, I called “AIRSPEED, 200 knots”, the PF then reduced power and regained our altitude and airspeed control. The AP was re-engaged and the flight continued normally from that point. Once above 10,000′, the PF and I discussed in detail what had happened. We both agreed that engaging the AP is not a good option immediately after takeoff and during the initial climb, especially when the aircraft is accelerating rapidly and climbing rapidly. We agreed that from now on, we’ll include AP engagement altitude and airspeeds during our pre-takeoff briefings. The AP did exactly what it was programmed to do, however, it has limitations it must observe as well. It can only trim the tail at a certain rate, and that is what contributed to the altitude bust. If we would have left the AP engaged, it would have recovered to 1500 (and was currently doing that, but it had to fly through 1500 during its transition phase). Relying on the AP to “keep you safe” may not be the best choice. Hand flying the aircraft and maintaining good speed and climb rate control is paramount prior to AP engagement. What needed to happen was a judicious power reduction to maintain acceptable airspeed and climb rate. With a altitude restriction of only 1387′ above the field elevation (113′), positive control must be maintained during that short time period. That is easily obtained by keeping the aircraft slow (180 KIAS) and climb rate at less than 1000 FPM. You can only do that by substantially reducing the power, which is counter intuitive during the takeoff and initial climb.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- The event highlights the importance of pilots understanding autopilot limitations and why automation should not be relied on during critical phases of flight.
- The crew handled the situation well by assessing the situation, understanding their errors, and proposing corrective actions.
GO AROUND ATTEMPT – ENGINE ISSUE
I was administering a 14CFR 135.293 proficiency check to one of our company captains. I simulated an engine failure at about 2700ft AGL, right above the KDMW airport. The pilot was high for their position in the pattern and chose to slip instead of making a circle or extending the pattern. He maintained the slip continuously for a couple of minutes. It was apparent he could touch down safely about midway down the runway. Because he was quite high, I chose not to clear the engine-which I normally do. At about 100ft AGL I instructed the pilot to go around. He added throttle, pitched up, and retracted the flaps to 50 pct. As we began to gain altitude, I looked over and saw that the throttle was advanced, but we appeared to have no power. There was no backfiring or other sign of a loaded-up engine, in fact there was no engine sound. The nose was high. Airspeed was decreasing through 70kts. I shouted, “Land!” and the pilot immediately brought the nose down. We landed safely on the remaining runway. The prop stopped during the rollout. The engine started up and ran perfectly immediately afterwards. In conversation with some personnel at Cirrus, our company learned that there have been previous incidents of fuel unporting and temporary interruption of fuel supply to the engine.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- A great training event where Captain’s vigilance and quick actions prevented a potentially dangerous situation.
- Captain allowed the pilot flying to execute landing during critical phase of flight without having to take control himself.
DIVERSION – LANDING GEAR ERROR
We departed towards KBCB with no issues. In flight after I looked at the airport details for KBCB, I noticed that there were no maintenance services at the airport and briefed the captain. We were performing the RNAV 13 into KBCB. The captain called for the gear down prior to SUNNY, the final approach fix, and I placed the gear lever in the down position. The red unlock light came on, but the green lights did not illuminate. There were no audible signs that anything changed under the plane either. The captain leveled the plane at 4,200 feet, 2,000 feet AGL. After talking shortly with the captain, I placed the lever up then back down again. The unlock light turned off then back on. I informed Roanoke approach of our troubles. We were visual with KBCB and were cleared for the visual approach. We stayed in the left traffic pattern for runway 13 at 4,200 feet MSL. I cycled the lever one more time with the same result, then left the lever in the down position with the unlock light illuminated. I took out the checklist and found Landing Gear Will Not Extend in tab Q1 of the abnormal checklist. We followed the checklist. The nose gear and the right main gear lights illuminated when the auxiliary gear control handle was pulled. The left gear light illuminated when the captain yawed the airplane per the checklist. The captain then pulled the gear blow down knob per the checklist create a positive lock. We did have three green lights and no red lights prior to pulling the gear blow down knob. After getting the gear down and knowing that we didn’t really want to land at KBCB due to the lack of services, I called OCC and let them know that we got the gear down, but the plane would require maintenance since we needed to use the gear blow down. During the call, the captain and I discussed and made the executive decision to divert to our filed alternate of KROA. I informed OCC and let them know we would talk to them on the ground. The landing gear stayed down for the remainder of the flight. We were cleared to KROA via radar vectors. The captain performed a visual approach to runway 24. Fire trucks on standby just in case. We did not do any fly over as we were nearly certain that the gear was down and locked due to checklist usage and the audible cues. We landed with no issues and taxied to FBO. While on approach, I was getting calls from maintenance. Ignored and called them back while taxiing. After shutting down, I inspected the gear and saw no obvious signs of any malfunction. I also inspected the hydraulic fluid level. It was more than full, but not overfilled. I am under the impression that it is an electrical issue.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- Crew’s proactive actions and situational awareness are commendable during a precarious situation.
- Proper CRM was applied to assess the situation, follow appropriate checklists, and prioritize tasks.
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION – FLAPS FAIL
After takeoff and cleanup from KBZN a FLAPS FAIL Amber CAS message posted. Ran the checklist and the problem remained. Procedures in QRH for landing without FLAPS precluded a return to KBZN – we continued to KVNY – called and emailed operations and Maintenance Control. We planned to try and lower FLAPS normally on arrival to KVNY and if unsuccessful would then divert to LAX to land on the long runway. On arrival at KVNY we were only able to lower FLAPS 1 (Slats only). We declared a pan-pan and diverted to LAX. We ran the checklist for landing with zero or partial FLAPS, computed a landing distance of 9000 feet due to only FLAPS 1 available. Flew the ILS 25L approach (11000 feet available) and landed without incident. LAX approach upgraded our status to Mayday and gave us priority and Emergency Response from fire department. Parked at Atlantic, coordinated with Tactical and MX Control.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- Exemplary actions by the crew during a peculiar situation. Consulted with appropriate parties on the ground before establishing a plan of action best suited for given circumstances.
FLIGHT DIVERSION – ELECTRICAL FIRE/SMOKE
While cruising at FL450, our lead passenger came up to chat with us briefly at the cockpit. My COE Copilot was PF (in the left seat), while I was PM (in the right). While we were chatting with our passenger, his wife alerted us to the fact that she “smells something like an electrical fire”. I asked her if she noticed any smoke, to which she replied “no”. Her husband then turned from the cockpit area to go back and assess the smell. He quickly returned and confirmed that he too smelled what seems to be an electrical fire. Both [name] and I could not yet smell anything in the cockpit. I decided to go back to the cabin to confirm the smell and attempt to assess the source of it. As soon as I had reached abeam the main cabin door, the pronounced and distinct smell of an electrical fire was present. I could not see any source of smoke; however, the cabin was beginning to look slightly hazy. I then advised the passengers that we would be making an immediate descent and diverting the aircraft. I returned to the cockpit and updated [name], who said he was just beginning to smell it up there. We discussed donning our oxygen masks and goggles, but felt they were not yet necessary. I declared an emergency with ATC and requested an immediate descent and a turn direct to Denver. I advised them of the number of souls onboard and our fuel remaining. [co-pilot name] began the descent and I began running the checklist. During this time, our lead passenger was pulling on panels in the overhead/walls to try to determine the source and advised that he saw smoke coming from “just aft of the galley near the upwash lighting”. I immediately moved the interior master switch to the off position. He then informed us that he believed that that had stopped the source of the smoke. [name] and I briefly discussed dropping the passenger oxygen masks and concluded that adding oxygen into the cabin would not be the best course of action. The haziness of the cabin at the time was not such that we believed the benefit could outweigh the risk. I then sent out an ACARS message to Ops advising them of the divert “Emer divert to DEN”, as we no longer had Wi-Fi due to the Interior Master being shut off. We continued the descent while preparing the aircraft for arrival. We advised ATC that we seemed to have the source under control but would still like the emergency trucks rolled for our arrival. They informed us that the trucks were already in position and awaiting our landing. We were then cleared direct to IF on the ILS 34L App. Prior to reaching the fix, we called the airport in sight and were cleared for a Visual App to RW34L. The landing was executed normally, and we came to a stop clear of the runway on the high-speed D6 taxiway. Tower informed us that the emergency trucks would like to visually inspect the exterior of the aircraft prior to us taxiing to the ramp. They performed the inspection and cleared us to the ramp with an airport-ops vehicle leading us there. Once parked, I debriefed our passengers, thanking them for their calm demeanor and understanding in the situation. I called our FOM, followed by our DM, and our Maintenance Manager to debrief them on the situation.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- Once again, commendable measures were taken by the crew in a hazardous situation. Good situational awareness, quick actions, and proper CRM allowed to get everyone on the ground safe.
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