Landing on Closed Runway
On this date, I was PIC and pilot flying an empty repo leg from PVD to CQX. I reported our out time as 1005 local. The last CQX METAR I reviewed indicated the ceiling was 3100. There was a layer reported as “few” below that at 1800 feet, so chose to depart PVD under IFR. When the approach controller for the CQX area was told that we had the 1-minute weather and that we wanted the RNAV-B approach, we were cleared to a fix on the feeder route.
Several minutes later, when we were approximately 20 miles from the fix, we were given a crossing restriction and cleared for the approach. As we made the turn to join the final approach course, the controller terminated radar services and provided IFR cancellation instructions. My SIC changed frequency to CTAF and made at least two (2) transmissions that I recall on the CTAF that we were inbound on the RNAV-B landing runway 24.
There was no traffic in the vicinity, and no airport personnel replied to our transmissions on the CTAF, which I had confirmed was the proper frequency during our approach briefing. Further, the CTAF is the FBO’s frequency. I estimate that we landed at 1042 local in that I reported we were “in” at 1045 local. My SIC canceled our IFR flight plan through the RCO once we had cleared the runway.
Incident:
After landing, when I asked the line staff inside the FBO for fuel, the person staffing the desk was surprised we were there because “the runway was closed due to field conditions.” It turns out that a NOTAM was published closing the runway at 1037 local, approximately 5 minutes prior to the time we landed. I believe this was after the approach controller had terminated radar services because, as stated above, we were terminated just after we had intercepted the final approach course, an approximately 12 NM leg. We were unaware that there had been any NOTAM published closing the runway. Once visual, I observed a wet runway with a snow-covered patch beyond the touchdown zone. The landing was uneventful despite a light crosswind and my use of full reverse, and I did not experience any difficulty maintaining directional control. I did not use brakes until approximately the last 500 feet, and I did not encounter any adverse response to braking.
Contact with Operational Control:
I discussed the situation of landing on a closed runway with operational control and agreed to monitor runway conditions for it to be reopened and to advise operational control prior to departing. At the request of operational control, I searched for but could not locate the airport manager to discuss the situation. At approximately 1119 local, I noticed the NOTAM closing the runway was gone and had been replaced by a
FICON NOTAM with a timestamp 1107 local. That NOTAM indicated 5/5/5.
The FICON NOTAM further reported 1/8-inch dry snow over both 80% and 40% of the runway. Regardless of this probable typo, I discussed the fact that the runway was no longer closed with operational control who approved our departure. We departed without incident after I reported us out at 1139 local.
Immediate action(s) taken:
I was able to see the runway once we had descended below the cloud layer. I could tell there was a wet area that was my aim point and intended point of touchdown, which was in the touchdown zone. Beyond that, the runway was covered in snow for a distance that I estimated to be only a couple hundred feet long where I presume the wind had blown snow across the runway.
The rest of the runway appeared only wet beyond the snow to the far end of the runway. I stated my intention to land in the wet area, which I did. The wet area in the touchdown zone was approximately one half (1/2) the size of the snow-covered portion.
I made my approach at 15 degrees flaps due to being in pusher ice mode, and I maintained the computed speed displayed by the dynamic speed bug for the last 500 to 1000 feet of the approach to landing. On short final, I stated to my SIC that the runway appeared otherwise clear and he concurred, so I proceeded to land. A post flight walk around revealed no damage or abnormalities. Then, as described above, once I was informed by FBO staff that the runway was closed, I called operational control to discuss the situation.
Suggestions:
I believe this was a result of poor timing in that the NOTAM closing the runway was published during the very brief time we were off frequency with the approach controller but prior to landing. I do not believe any crew action could have prevented this incident.
ERC Notes:
- Event investigated internally. Operator confirmed the time sequence mentioned in the report.
- Crew did not receive any notice of the runway closure. Uncontrolled airfield. The runway closed while the aircraft was on the final approach. Crew was announcing positions (including UNICOM frequency). Did not receive any responses/warnings.
- Root cause: unfortunate timing of runway closure minutes before aircraft landed.
- The runway was re-opened minutes after landing.
Go Around – Traffic On Runway
We were approaching to land at MDW. I was the PIC and the pilot flying. The first officer was the pilot monitoring. Approach control had cleared us for the ILS4R and instructed us contact the tower at the final approach fix. At the FAF, the first officer contacted the tower.
Tower cleared us to land on runway 4R and asked which FBO we planned to park at. The FO responded, and the tower asked if we’d like to sidestep and land on 4L instead, which would result in a marginally shorter taxi. I indicated to the FO that I preferred to land on 4R since we were already set up and on a stabilized approach. The FO responded to the tower by saying that 4R would work for us. The tower didn’t acknowledge the FO’s response. Since we had been previously cleared to land on 4R and the tower never cancelled our landing clearance, we continued approaching the runway. Shortly thereafter, the tower cleared a business jet to take off and assigned the crew of that aircraft a heading to fly after departure. That crew began taxiing their aircraft onto runway 4R.
The tower did not tell the crew of that jet there was another aircraft (us) on short final. A crew member in that aircraft read back takeoff clearance for 4R but asked the controller to repeat the assigned heading. The pilot admitted they didn’t catch the heading instruction because they were busy completing a checklist. The tower repeated the heading assignment, and the pilot read it back. Meanwhile, it became apparent to the FO and I that there wasn’t enough separation between our aircraft and the jet taxiing onto runway 4R.
We both agreed we’d likely have to go around. As we approached a mile or so final, the other jet still hadn’t completely lined up on the runway or started the takeoff roll. At this point the FO called for a go around, and I responded and commenced the go around. Meanwhile, the crew of the other aircraft continued their takeoff, seemingly unaware of what was happening. As we climbed and cleaned up the aircraft, the FO informed the tower we were going around due to traffic on the runway. Tower seemed confused and asked us to repeat the transmission. The FO restated that we were going around due to traffic on the runway. Tower acknowledged this and instructed us to turn right to a heading of 130°.
After a short delay, the tower instructed us to climb to 3000 feet and contract departure. The FO contacted departure, who then instructed us to turn right again to 220°. Once the approach controller confirmed we had the airport in sight, he cleared us for a visual approach to runway 4R and instructed us to contact tower again. The FO contacted tower and that controller cleared us to land. We landed and taxied to the FBO without further incident.
ERC Notes
- Audio recording reviewed.
- Pilots acted appropriately, issue from ATC perspective. Operator is planning to reach out to tower for a follow up.
- FAA recommends questioning/challenging ATC when necessary.
[Tail number] Arrival LFPB
It was my first time flying into LFPB as the First Officer of a flight that originated from KTEB. I had no prior experience in the area and understood that I needed to make sure I had read all the arrival, approach and landing information on the airport section of the Jeppsen plates. While enroute, I completed all of the reading and reviewed it with the captain to make sure we established a solid understanding with excellent communication as part of our briefing.
Captain mentioned that we should expect our filed arrival STAR (VELOL9E) followed by a transition at the end waypoint MOPAR, to the Initial Fix (IF) for the ILS 7 since that was the approach in use on the current ATIS. We both looked at the filed VELOL9E arrival while the captain briefed the plate and we both confirmed that our FMS was properly loaded.
We searched for a transition from VELOL9E to the ILS7 on the Jeppsen plates and there was no plate available. We both agreed that our final waypoint was MOPAR and we would expect vectors after MOPAR for the ILS 7. As we entered the terminal area and during our descent, the ATC controller who had a heavy French accent, gave us a direct clearance to KOLIV waypoint and a continue descent to FL70, of which I immediately readback the clearance obtained “direct to KOLIV and descend to FL70”. As we continued our descent, we were directed to change frequencies to our final approach controller.
I checked in with our new approach controller with our passing level and descending to FL70. Upon reaching KOLIV waypoint, we turned towards MOPAR waypoint, and the approach controller query us, why were we turning to the left, if were given the KOLIV 7E transition approach. I responded to the approach controller that we were on the VELOL9E as part of our flight plan. The controller said, “no you must continue on the KOLIV 7E and gave us an initial heading towards the waypoint that followed KOLIV on the KOLIV 7E. I immediately replied back with the heading and the captain turned as directed.
As the Captain flew, I selected the NAV function and Arrival page of the FMS and looked for the KOLIV 7E arrival. KOLIV7E was not an option in the STAR page. I continued to delete the VELOL9E STAR and again looked for the KOLIV7E arrival. Again, the KOLIV7E arrival was not available in the FMS and I informed the captain that it was not in there. I immediately selected the KOLIV7E Jeppsen plate on my IPAD and I told the Captain that I would give him that Waypoint that we were instructed to go to. I punched it in the FMS and we went direct to the fix.
Upon reaching the fix, we turned left to the assigned heading of 155 degrees on the plate, and continued to the Initial fix PB410 waypoint as published, for the ILS 7. During this time, the controller asked us if we were RNAV capable, and I responded with yes, we are RNAV capable. He said that we needed to be ready for any RNAV approach assigned to us next time. He then cleared us for the ILS 7 and switched us to tower. The final segment of the approach and landing was completed with excellent CRM, completing all checklists, stable approach and a safety check prior to landing.
Suggestions:
After landing and shutdown, the captain and I completed a thorough review of our flight in the Paris terminal area and identified the following:
- During my communication with the ATC controller that had the heavy French accent, who gave us the direct to KOLIV and descend to FL70, I should have asked to read back the clearance going direct to KOLIV to make sure the entire clearance was received correctly. Also, the Captain mentioned that the ATC controller had the opportunity to correct any incorrect read back and he did not.
- While we were flying direct to KOLIV, a waypoint on our Arrival, we should have asked the ATC controller to verify that we were still on the VELOL9E upon arriving at KOLIV and that we were making that turn to MOPAR, instead of assuming that we were to continue on our filed arrival VELOL9E.
- The captain informed me that selecting NAV function, Arrival page and STAR was not enough to bring the KOLIV7E transition. I would also have to reload the entire ILS 7 approach first in order to have the KOLIOV 7E transition available and be able to select it.
- Excellent and clear Communication between the crew and ATC controllers must exist at all times in order to make sure the right clearance is being flown. We planned and continued our VELOL9E arrival upon arriving at KOLIV and the controller expected us to continue on KOLIV7E upon arriving at KOLIV which became a conflict after waypoint KOLIV.
ERC Notes
- Safety memo sent out to pilot group
Wrong Passenger
Pilot Monitoring
The day started off normal. Normal duty day with standard flight planning and preflight procedures. We were set to fly an international trip from KTYQ to MMTL with 6 PAX on board. The passengers showed up late with lots of baggage. This was an external pressure that added an additional layer of stress to the crew, we also had Owner Services present who were talking to the PAX, so we additionally had to work around that. With all of these added external factors, we were rushing to get going, still trying to follow safe and proper procedures. I got a head count while the PIC checked identification and passports. However, the PIC failed to compare the passports to the manifest.
This resulted in transporting a passenger that was not supposed to be on the flight. The head count was correct, but the passenger got swapped out for another without updating the manifest, unknown to us at the time. We landed safely and the PAX eventually got cleared through customs. All ops were conducted safely, and this was taken as a learning experience for us as crew.
Pilot in Command
I flew 6 passengers from TYQ to MMTL on Jan 29, 2025 in [tail number]. There were several factors that contributed this incident, but the issue is that despite checking everyone’s passport, making sure they were all signed and not expired, but because of those “other factors”, I didn’t compare them to my passenger list to know that one of the passengers was swapped out for a different person. The factors that interrupted my normal procedures are that I was stressed about the international flight due to a previous international flight not going well. Ichecked again to make sure we had all of our paperwork but then received a last- minute addition that contributed to my stress.
Passengers arrived 30 minutes late, with lots of bags and stuff, that we were scrambling to load into the baggage compartment and then unload half to move into the cabin to make our weight and balance work out. Client relations were there to greet the passengers and when they arrived, they were deep in conversation, and I was trying to do my job without interrupting. I also had flown these passengers a dozen times and knew them well, so since there were 6 guys that I knew, on the manifest, these were the 6 guys that were supposed to be there. I’m very aware of the mistake that I made and will ensure that I will compare the identification with the manifest by printing it out and keeping it in my hand till that task is complete.
ERC Notes
- Captain failed to check passports against trip sheet/manifest.
- Event disclosed with TSA.
- VDRP filed.
- Crew debriefed and counseled, underwent remedial training.
