In light of recent events, this safety newsletter focuses on reports related to ATC issues. It is widely acknowledged that U.S. Airspace system is facing multiple challenges ranging from staffing shortages to delayed modernization efforts. According to U.S. GAO (Government Accountability Office) 51 of 138 national ATC systems evaluated by FAA are currently unsustainable, with 17 of them determined especially concerning. FAA currently employs roughly 11,000 Air Traffic Controllers, down from 13,000 in 2022 and 3,500 short of recommended 14,500.
Expectedly, this results in delays, pilots experiencing lapses in communications, and an increase in near-miss incidents. As of February 2025, issues related to National Aviation Systems accounted for 6.51% of delays, accounting for 22.15% of total delayed minutes.
Although the data is concerning, steps are being taken to address the issue. U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy has requested $20B in initial funding for ATC modernization. The plan is to modernize radars, radios, network connections, and build six new ATC centers. Understandably, implementation will take some time. This is why it is paramount for pilots to take additional steps to ensure safe operations.
Recommendations
- Practice increased situational awareness: track other aircraft movements and frequencies when possible. Keep a mental picture of your airspace and flight plan.
- Question ATC instructions if something seems/feels unsafe or abnormal.
- Conduct thorough briefings to review charts, anticipated clearances, frequencies, and transitions. Use proper Crew Resource Management and clearly assign responsibilities.
Seattle Center Comms Issue
Enroute while in cruise at FL450 out of KBFI we were advised to switch over to Seattle center on 118.6. We checked in and were acknowledged by ATC to fly direct KU06M on our ifr flight plan to KMKC. For the next 10-15 minutes approximately everything seemed normal with normal radio chatter between aircraft and ATC. Then it slowly went silent and after 15 minutes as PM I tried to reestablish contact 3 times with Seattle Center. Without success we then tried them on 121.5 and someone told us to switch to Salt Lake Center on 132.75. We established communications with Salt Lake and had them radio check both our radios to ensure they hear us clearly and they received us “5 by 5”. They also stated Seattle Center is having issues with a few of their transmitters. The flight continued uneventful to our destination.
Near Miss – Departure
Weather at the time of incident was CAVU (Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited). Incident occurred at KSJC. [tail number] was instructed to taxi across RWY 30L and hold short of RWY30R. While crossing RYW 30L, we were cleared for takeoff on RWY30R.
While SIC (PF) was taxiing onto RWY30R, I (PM) looked over at the approach end of RWY30R. I observed a Piper Cherokee on short final (1/8 SM) at approximately 200′ on approach for RWY30R.
I instructed PF to hold on RWY30R and NOT start our takeoff. I announced on tower frequency that we are “HOLDING ON RWY30R”. After a long pause (assuming Piper was continuing approach onto runway obviously occupied by another aircraft), tower instructed Piper to “GO-AROUND” and commented that Piper was cleared to land on RWY30L.
The shadow of the Piper crossed our profile and continued down the RWY30R centerline. Estimated distance overhead (50′ – 100′).
Piper executed go-around straight ahead and then announced intention to continue for Reid Hillview airport.
I request the Piper tail number from tower for ASAP report – Piper N Number is [tail number]
Tower may NOT have seen Piper lined up on wrong runway, but it was obviously on short final to our runway. He should have double check and should NOT have given us takeoff clearance. If we had continued our takeoff, it could have ended up in a mid-air collision or at the very least, a Near Miss with the piper caught in our wake turbulence at very low altitude.
ATC Coordination Issue
On April 3, at approx. 1755 local time at KBCT, we were given the VUUDU1 arrival while returning from the south back to the USA from SEGU, Guayaquil airport Ecuador. We contacted Palm Beach approach control. On initial contact we requested the RNAV 5 KBCT with the local weather ATIS L. We were cleared to OWLLL waypoint at 9000 ft, and to expect RNAV 5 ft approach. After OWLLL we were cleared down to 7000 FT on our way to VETCH and DIVRR. The frequency was extremely busy with traffic. The controller was task saturated and kept us high and descended us late. He gave us the option for the visual to compensate for the late direction and vectoring. We did not accept, as visibility was not adequate from our vantage point and many small GA aircraft in the area. Weather conditions were deteriorating. Rain, broken clouds and reduced visibility to approx. 1700 ft AGL. We were given a vector away from KBCT and sent back to MIA approach. MIA approach controller slowed us further to 170 KTS and stepped us down to 3000 FT, 2500 FT. and then 1500 FT (MSA 2600). We received vectors and were cleared to intercept RNAV 5 final course. We were then cleared for RNAV 5 and intercepted inbound course, approach modes armed. We were set to intercept the final course after FEYVO waypoint, approach lateral modes armed and then active. The controller advised that there was traffic crossing our final on their way to another satellite airport before TANAH. The controller queried if we had the traffic in sight and if not, we needed to climb. This was given in one statement. This was a surprise as we were now cleared for approach.
We reconfirmed that he needed us to climb. We did not have visual on the traffic nor the airport. We executed a climb to 2000 ft. After the traffic was no longer a factor, we were re-cleared to descend to 1500 ft. We descended to 1500 ft and rejoin the approach. We were high on the glide path. As we broke out of IMC, we had the visual on the runway and once again high on glide path. The controller offered a resequencing of the approach. Although we were high, we could safely get back on path with a steeper approach angle with normal maneuvering by TANAH. Given the choice of a steeper approach correction verses going back into the “wild west”, we elected to stay with the approach. We were within FAR 91.175 and did not receive a “sink rate” EGPWS warning. In a very short amount of time, the crew workload was now extremely high. Although regulations are ambiguous, the approach controller should have given us a go around and not put the burden on us to make the “game time” decision. The crossing aircraft must have been coded due to the TFR. Who was he talking to? Why was another aircraft crossing the final approach path we were established on? This is not an acceptable position to be placed in. We were being handled as a VFR aircraft even though we were on an instrument approach.
Too much traffic in the area and on frequency. The controllers were saturated trying to manage all the traffic. They were not able to effectively manage the workload and could not give timely direction. Being handled as a VFR aircraft while on an instrument approach in reduced visibility and IMC conditions. Aircraft crossing final approach course at same altitude as cleared, established aircraft. My concern is not only the amount of traffic assigned to a controller in a given sector, but repeatedly giving the option of a visual approach or maintaining visual separation. We specifically requested an instrument approach to negate the burden of visual separation from other aircraft. The crew accepting the visual negates ATC from separation requirements and puts the burden on the aircrew. This is a reoccurring issue GA crews deal with going into satellite airports mixed with light GA and VFR aircraft. It is extremely difficult to maintain visual separation in general, not to mention in a target rich environment. In this scenario, the waters were further muddied by ATC mixing the separation criteria for instrument approach verses visual separation and when to issue a missed approach. Once again, we did not expect to be handled like a VFR aircraft on a visual approach. We landed safely without incident and taxied to customs.
Taxi Event- ATC Error
On May 20, 2025, at approximately 16:35 CDT, I was on [tail number] when we landed on Runway 18 at OLV and exited via the Foxtrot taxiway, following standard procedure. As we taxied on Foxtrot, the tower asked where we were parking, and we responded, “Executive”. Our trip sheet indicated we were supposed to park at Memphis Executive Jet Center, and we were aware of the taxiway closures from the airport diagram, which were in effect from May 15, 2024, to June 12, 2025.
The Tower controller instructed us to “taxi via Alpha, left on Delta, and wait for further instructions,” stating that getting to the FBO would be “a maze” due to the construction. We followed the instructions, turning left onto Delta from Alpha, and stopped where directed, at the intersection of Delta and the Tower Ramp, near Taxiway D on the airport diagram.
Tower then directed us to taxi past the 1st row of planes and make a right turn. Upon turning we noticed the path looked narrow with parked planes on both sides, but we proceeded as instructed, assuming the FBO was operational and that an established alternate route to navigate the construction to the FBO existed. According to the airport diagram, there appeared to be multiple routes that could have allowed a path to or near the FBO. However, after making the right turn onto the North Ramp, it became clear that continuing may be a tight fit. To clear the parked aircraft, we would have had to offset slightly from the yellow taxi line, which seemed strange. However, we believed that there must be alternative parking and taxi route for the FBO.
After moving about 500 feet down the North Ramp, Tower instructed us to hold our position, near the spot marked as “Point We Stopped” in the attached photo. We stopped and waited for about a minute. A ground crew member approached on a motorized skateboard, appearing as though he might act as a wing walker. I queried Tower over the radio to clarify the plan, asking about the intended route to the FBO. Tower responded by instructing us to continue holding our position and stated they would send a tug to move us. At that point the aircraft was shut down.
While we were stopped and awaiting the tug, Olive Branch Aviation sent a car to the aircraft. The passengers were deplaned and transported along with their bags to the FBO. This occurred before the aircraft was repositioned. Later, we learned that Tower should not have directed us toward Memphis Executive Jet Center, as it was closed for construction, a detail not indicated on our trip sheet.
Eventually, Olive Branch Aviation sent a tug, and using our aircraft’s tow bar, the ground crew towed us from the North Ramp near Taxiway D to their ramp, marked as the Olive Branch Aviation Ramp near Taxiway E on the airport diagram. They repositioned the aircraft without any issues.
Unclear Instructions/Communication with ATC
On our leg from KIXD-KVIS, we were held high by center. We were given a “step down” decent, and I (PF) selected a vertical speed that I felt was appropriate to get down in a reasonable manner. We had listened to the AWOS at KVIS and winds were reported as 120 @5 knots, so we advised approach that we wanted the visual approach to runway 12. Once we reported “field in sight”, Approach cleared us for the visual into KVIS. (they did not indicate which runway) We continued with our decent but I was still high and I needed more time.
The PIC suggested a right turn to join an extended left downwind for RWY 12. shortly after that turn was made, we heard traffic reporting in the pattern for RWY 30. We started a left turn back towards the airport and at that time, approach called us on the CTAF frequency and gave us a heading to fly and to climb to 4,000’ (We were at 3,000’). We complied and they asked us to switch back to their frequency.
Once on frequency, they asked which runway we were planning on landing and the PIC (PM) stated we had requested the visual to RWY 12 due to winds being reported as favorable to 12 but that there was traffic in the pattern for 30, and planned to switch runways. Approach came back and said that they thought we were going to RWY 30 and that was a mistake on their end. They vectored us overhead the airport to join a right downwind for RWY 30. We landed without issue.
