The following are redacted Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reports from participating member companies during May 2024. Each case underscores the unique challenges that test the skills and preparedness of the crew. These incidents highlight the critical importance of adhering to standard procedures and the valuable lessons learned from navigating unexpected situations.
AIR RETURN – LANDING GEAR
All preflight, start-up, and taxi checks were performed with normal indications. Takeoff was performed from runway 18 with normal indications. Gear was selected up on positive climb. Passing through 400′ AGL, on initiation of flap retraction, SIC noted the red gear unsafe light was still illuminated. PIC and SIC discussed the issue and attempted to recycle the landing gear. We decided the safest course of action was to return to KJVY. We contacted Louisville Departure and informed them we wished to return to KJVY and cancel IFR. We initiated a left traffic pattern for runway 18. During the approach we determined the aircraft was above max landing weight. We elected to discontinue the approach, and initiate a holding pattern at 3000 feet MSL, 8 nautical miles northeast of the airport. We continued flight in the holding pattern until reaching max landing weight and initiated a visual approach to KJVY. The gear extended and locked normally on approach to runway 18. Landing and taxi were performed with normal indications.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- Exceptional job by the crew who properly assessed the situation and prioritized safety by electing to execute an air return.
- Since the mechanical issue was not critical to flight, the crew wisely elected to enter a holding pattern to burn off fuel and meet maximum landing weight requirements.
AIR RETURN – RUDDER STANDBY SYSTEM FAILURE
The flight was uneventful throughout the preflight, engine start, taxi, and take-off. During our climb, after take-off and climb checklists were performed and no discrepancies were noted. However, when climbing to filed altitude of FL430 and passing through FL200 we received an amber caution message in the CAS display as well as the light. The message said, “hydraulic B fluid low”. The PIC and I double checked that with the HYD page and it indeed matched what was happening. We observed the HYD fluid quantity rapidly decreasing on the B system. At this moment we decided to start following checklist procedures, and while doing so, we received another amber CAS message that said, “Rudder Standby System Fail”. Again, we confirmed it with the HYD page, and it had a psi of 0. By this time the B system also had 0% quantity and 0 psi. We decided to stop the climb at FL260 to be able to run through the checklist in a more efficient manner. After doing so, the PIC (PM) and myself (PF), made the decision to declare an emergency and return to KTPA since it provided all services and long runways.
Because we were scheduled to fly a transcontinental flight to California, we had a lot of extra fuel so we had to descend and get vectors while trying to burn some fuel to help the landing weight. After some time it was decided that it would be better to land a little overweight, rather than risking losing a Hydraulic System, given the fact we did not know what caused the issue initially. The landing was performed by the PIC. We came in fast due to partial flaps and heavy weight, but very smooth touch down. After being checked by fire rescue we taxied to FBO where we shut down the aircraft. No injuries to crew or pax.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- Another example of an air return situation, but where the situation necessitated immediate landing despite aircraft slightly exceeding maximum weight restrictions.
- Commendable actions by the crew to thoroughly assess the situation, prioritize tasks and choose best course of action in a given situation.
DEPARTURE ISSUE – INCORRECT DEPARTURE PROCEDURE
The weather was VFR at Van Nuys Airport. We arrived at the airport 2hrs early in preparation for the flight. We had sufficient time to load the FMS Reviewing the departure procedure and route of flight. We both missed the final check of the FGC’s proper mode. It was selected to Heading instead of LNAV. We both missed this oversight until we had already deviated. We were cleared for Takeoff using the HAYZE9 DP. It is a straight-out departure with a slow turn to the right.
After positive climb I commanded SIC to raise the gear, select manual speed to 200kts and FLTCH. I was following theVbars while SIC was completing other tasks at the time. While his head was down ATC made a radio call that we were off course. SIC looked up and switched to LNAV as I simultaneously corrected with a turn to the right. We returned to the correct course and soon after were given a phone number to call. No other issues occurred during the remainder of the flight. After landing at our destination CNY, I called the number that was given to us and explained the deviation. SIC and I spoke at length debriefing the event and what caused the confusion that led to the left turn. I believe it may have been my confusion with a commonly used departure from 34L. I believe our CRM was not up to standards for both pilots during the departure. We bothmissed the LNAV selection. I should have queried SIC before I started the turn. He was occupied at the moment and I wasn’t. In the future I will promptly correct the SIC if he is doing unnecessary procedures below 10,000ft per our GOM 18.20. I will also pay more attention to the FGC selections in the future. I think we both learned some valuable lessons from this experience and Iwill personally be more methodical and run through the checklists slower in the future.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- Despite being a minor event, the case highlights the importance of proper CRM.
- Captain showed exemplary leadership by acknowledging and taking ownership of the mistake, debriefing the SIC and proposing corrective actions to avoid similar situations in the future.
GO AROUND ATTEMPT – ENGINE ISSUE
I was administering a 14CFR 135.293 proficiency check to one of our company captains. I simulated an engine failure at about 2700ft AGL, right above the KDMW airport. The pilot was high for their position inthe pattern and chose to slip instead of making a circle or extending the pattern. He maintained the slip continuously for a couple of minutes. It was apparent he could touch down safely about midway down the runway. Because he was quite high, I chose not to clear the engine-which I normally do. At about 100ft AGL I instructed the pilot to go around. He added throttle, pitched up, and retracted the flaps to 50 pct. As we began to gain altitude, I looked over and saw that the throttle was advanced, but we appeared to have no power. There was no backfiring or other sign of a loaded-up engine, in fact there was no engine sound. The nose was high. Airspeed was decreasing through 70kts. I shouted, “Land!” and the pilot immediately brought the nose down. We landed safely on the remaining runway. The prop stopped during the rollout. The engine started up and ran perfectly immediately afterwards. In conversation with some personnel at Cirrus, ourcompany learned that there have been previous incidents of fuel unporting and temporary interruption of fuel supply to the engine. The SR22 AFM does not contain any information about this hazard or how to mitigate it.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- Flight instructor’s vigilance and quick actions prevented a potentially catastrophic situation.
- Great training event that highlights importance of proficiency checks conducted by highly experienced instructors.
- Operator deserves commendation for taking it upon themselves to bring the incident to the attention of aircraft manufacturer.
FIRE EVENT – ENGINE FIRE
Upon the captain starting the left engine, I called out hot start. Captain shut off the left thrust lever followed byimmediate actions of turning off the ignition and let the engine dry motor. I noticed the ramp marshal start to move towards the left side of the jet and yell “fire”. The captain and I confirmed witheach other that the ramp personnel was indeed yelling “fire”. I immediately jumped up and opened the cabin door to assess the fire situation and the captain followed. Upon seeing the fire, the captain immediately pushed the engine fire switch and asked if the fire was still present, to which I confirmed as he came back to the cabin door to look at the fire situation. The captain fired the second halon bottle, which from our perspective appeared to control the fire.
A maintenance personnel was standingbehind the wing and notified us that the fire was still present in the jet pipe. We told the ramp and maintenance personnel to call the fire squad as we went to the rear of the engine to assess the fire status. The captain opted to use the portable halon bottle from the galley to extinguish the fire from atop a ladder provided by the maintenance personnel, which was successful. Approximately 3 minutes later, a fire truck arrived and asked us if the fire was out. I told the fire responder that it was, we shook hands, and they left. After the situation was under control, the captain contacted the company.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- A reminder that hazardous events can occur during all phases of flight operations, including on the ground.
- Exceptional job by the crew to properly mitigate the situation while coordinating with all applicable parties (ground staff, maintenance, fire department).
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM/EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION – ENGINE
On 21 March 2023 aircraft was towed from its hanger position onto the ramp and pre flighted and ordered fuel fromoperations, because the fuel gages read 800 #’s on the right and 1400#’s on the left. I thought that was odd to havesuch a large difference in fuel. I spoke to the maintenance manager to see if any maintenance run ups were performed since we acquired the plane about a week prior. He indicated that fuel was added to the left tank from the draining of fuel from another aircraft that was there for Maintenance. I notified OCC of a change in weight due to the cargo loaded and received a new weight and balance. Once reviewed I accepted it. By that time the fueler arrived and I confirmed the requested amounts, top off both outboard wing tanks that will equip the aircraftwith 3200#’s of fuel. Min fuel for this trip was 2500#’s and a trip fuel burn of 2000#’s. About 6 min later fueler walked into the hanger to inform me that the right tank was full. I walked out to the plane to confirm. I pushed down the flapper and confirmed the tank appeared to be full of fuel. I instructed fueler to fill the left tank and returned to the hanger to speak to the Maintenance Manager in regards to the fuel indicator and the fuel level by observation. It was noted and the MEL procedure was implemented. I performed the standard start process, avionics initialization, programming, and checklist through the taxi. Picked up weather, clearance and taxi clearance and beganheading to the assigned runway 15.
At the run up pad performed the necessary first flight of the day run ups all was satisfactory and let tower know I was ready to go. Performed a standard takeoff on runway 15 right turn direct, TENAT, 11000 Feet. Performed the standardchecklist, after takeoff, through 10k, through 18 and cruse check list. After 5 minutes I performed the engine trends notation. I scanned instruments regularly to include the fuel gauge. About 30 min into the flight I noticed the right fuel gage had not moved but theleft gage moved as it should in accordance with the fuel burn of 380 lbs/hr per engine. The right fuel gage was notmoving but the left gage was moving IAW the fuel flow. This went on till I got to the Texas/New Mexico border. The right gage started moving quickly, quicker than the respective fuel burn. About 30 min from ABQ, all right fuel gage dropped to zero and the R low fuelindicator caution light came on. 2 minutes after that the R col tank low annunciator came on and about 30 seconds later the right engine failed.
Once the engine was secured per memory items I pulled out the QRH and started with the R Col tank low annunciator, flipped the fuel transfer switch and attempted an engine restart. Engine failed to restart. Again secured the right engine. I contacted ATC and declared an emergency and gave them the necessary information. I also requested they call my dispatch to inform them of my situation. I also quickly calculated my top of descent and the rate of descent needed to maintain 150 knots. I calculated that to be 45 Miles out and 1500FPM. I made this request to ATC and followed it. My fuel calculations fell in line with this descent plan. After all this I noticed my R fuel gage had risen due to the fuel transfer, so I attempted a 2 engine restart. Engine was restarted about 60 miles from ABQ. The flight continued as planned and landed without incident.
KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- Stellar job by pilots to proactively prepare for the flight and bring attention to concerning items on the aircraft.
- Excellent CRM by delegating ATC to contact operator’s dispatch while making calculations and executing proper checklists.
