Operated with Incorrect and Out of CG Weight and Balance
During recent flights, we used the automatically generated weight and balance reports provided by the flight dispatch system. I observed that several of these reports showed Weight and Balance figures outside the aircraft’s approved limitations and service envelope. The automated Weight and Balance calculations appear to consistently assume a fixed load of 18-19 passengers on employee shuttle flights, rather than reflecting the actual number of passengers on board. This results in an inaccurate center of gravity calculations.
In some cases, these erroneous computations were accepted without the required manual verification. I was concerned this may not align with the procedures outlined in the company, Flight Operations Manual, and applicable FARs. I believe this is a systemic issue that could affect flight safety, and I respectfully request a review of the dispatch system’s weight and balance logic to ensure accurate data for all crews.
Suggestions:
1. Correct the software data integration between scheduling and dispatch systems.
2. Issue a safety bulletin reminding all pilots of their mandatory duty to manually verify weight and balance on every flight.
3. Implement temporary manual procedures until the automated system is fixed. This needs to be addressed immediately to ensure regulatory compliance and flight safety.
ERC Acceptance & Closing Notes:
- Sole source. Pilot found flight software was off on weight balance.
- Company conducted audit and confirmed.
- Company has since updated everything on that aircraft.
Safety Takeaway:
Pilots control an aircraft by using aerodynamic surfaces such as elevators, ailerons, and rudders. If the aircraft’s weight distribution places the CG outside approved limits:
- The control surfaces may not generate enough force to maneuver the aircraft effectively.
- The aircraft may respond unpredictably to pilot inputs.
- Recovery from unusual flight conditions may become difficult or impossible.
- An improperly balanced aircraft may still get airborne, but it may not remain safely controllable.
Aircraft System/Equipment Malfunction
Following weight and balance calculations, engine start, and completion of all required checklists, the aircraft departed normally. During climb through 6,000 feet, a left bleed air failure occurred, accompanied by Master Warning and Caution indications. The crew completed the applicable checklist, placing the left bleed air switch to PNEU & Environmental Off and monitoring pressurization. After reviewing the MEL, the PIC determined the flight could continue provided the switch remained in that position, and the aircraft stayed below FL250.
Additional abnormalities included a momentary left engine DISCHARGE light, yaw damper disengagement, and a torque differential. Throttle adjustments corrected the torque imbalance, and the yaw damper was re-engaged. During climb, the cabin altitude began increasing beyond the controller setting, trending approximately 3,000 feet higher than selected. The PIC briefed the SIC on the potential need for an emergency descent.
At 20,000 feet, a CABIN ALTITUDE alert illuminated as cabin altitude continued to rise. The PIC initiated a descent, and ATC approved an emergency descent to 10,000 feet. Upon reaching 10,000 feet, the alert extinguished. Due to the pressurization malfunction and mountainous terrain at the destination, the PIC elected to return to [airport]. ATC provided clearance, and the flight proceeded uneventfully at 9,000 feet back to [airport], where it landed without further incident.
After landing, passengers deplaned, maintenance was briefed, and a ground operational check duplicated the issue. Maintenance subsequently determined that the left bleed air line had ruptured.
Although the trip was reassigned to another aircraft, the crew assessed their fitness for duty following the event. The PIC reported fatigue, while the SIC reported headache and nausea. After rest and hydration, the PIC felt improved; however, the SIC did not feel fit for duty. The crew collectively determined they were not fit to continue, notified logistics, and were removed from the trip.
ERC Acceptance & Closing Notes:
- Crew debriefed and counseled.
- CRM issues (lack of leadership from PIC, did not follow checklist procedures).
- PIC has been demoted to SIC. Both pilots have been re-trained and are currently being mentored. FAA recommends adding scenarios to pilot’s future retraining courses.
Safety Takeaway:
Continuous Risk Assessment Is essential. The PIC initially determined the flight could continue under MEL limitations. However, when new information such as the cabin altitude continued climbing, pressurization performance deteriorated, CABIN ALTITUDE warning activated, a prompt decision wasn’t made. A safe decision at one point in the flight may no longer be safe as conditions change. Anticipating a worsening condition allows faster and more effective responses.
Aircraft System/Equipment Malfunction – Air Return
Captain – Pilot Monitoring/Pilot Not Flying
On [date] at 08:38 local time, [tail number] departed [airport name] for [airport name]. There were 7 passengers and 3 crewmembers onboard. Weather was greater than 10 miles visibility and clear skies. Upon climbing through 10000 feet, the Autopilot (AP) was turned on, and we continued the climb to FL 210. At approximately 15000 feet, the airplane abruptly pitched up, and the AP turned off. The crew stopped the climb and asked to return to [airport name] to further troubleshoot. The AP was not turned back on and the crew came in for an approach to 1L and landed with no further issues. The passengers disembarked and flew home commercially, as Gulfstream was called to assist with the troubleshooting. Four hours later, we learned from one of the passengers that two of the passengers had hit their heads during the event. One passenger mentioned having a bump on her head and not feeling “right”. The other passenger reports having soreness on his head and neck, and that he napped on the plane which is very strange for him. He also says that he feels “out of it”. They are both planning on going to the doctor once they arrive in [airport name], but that they are starting to feel better. All other passengers report no injuries.
ERC Acceptance & Closing Notes:
- Crew was complying with MEL.
- Gulfstream produced a new MOL procedure as a result of event.
- Company has sent this data to NTSB and will send it to FAA after meeting.
- Gulfstream concluded inspection of aircraft was not needed afterward.
- FAA recommendations – encourage crew to declare an emergency and brief to pilot groups.
- Company conducted training with pilots with emphasis on proper procedures on declaring an emergency.
Safety Takeaway:
Prompt risk mitigation was conducted from this event. The crew made the correct safety decision to stop the climb, terminate the autopilot use, and return to base. Continuing a flight with a compromised primary flight control system introduces unacceptable risk.
